Introduction
The last decade has seen progress in international economic integration in various parts of the world. Formal regional economic arrangements have probably progressed furthest in Europe, with the creation of a customs union in 1956, the common market in 1992 and the prospects of European Monetary Union in 1999. Similar developments can be observed in the Western Hemisphere, with NAFTA and MERCOSUR. Though there are no formal monetary arrangements analogous to the EMS, many of these countries have an important role for the US dollar, and when they peg their currency, they peg to the dollar. In South-East Asia, ASEAN is developing a free-trade area, perhaps related to the in uence of the Japanese yen in Asia. A n umber of empirical studies Wei 1993a, 1993b have investigated the link between trade blocs and currency blocs. The motivation for attempts to strengthen currency links in free-trade areas is the reduction of exchange rate risk, and the resulting encouragement of trade. Based on similar arguments, the literature on the optimal exchange rate peg suggests that greater weight should be attached to currencies of major trading partners. 1 This paper provides a complementary explanation for the link between trade policy and monetary policy coordination, using a game-theoretic approach. The use of policy instruments may be graduated so that co-operation at the`lower' level is enforceable by the threat that, were it to fail,`higher' level instruments would be used non-cooperatively. Co-operation at the`lower' level is typically co-operation where gains are not very high and, as a result, coordination is di cult to sustain. Co-operation at the`higher' level comprises areas where gains from co-operation are high and, as a result, the failure of coordination is costly. Basevi et al 1990 formalise such a game for two countries in a two-period general equilibrium model typically used in trade policy models. They assume that monetary policy is e ective because wages are xed at a level above the Walrasian equilibrium level, and are rigid downwards, creating unemployment. Domestic money expansion that reduces unemployment will create a positive externality, since it worsens the terms of trade of the home country. The country would like t o co-operate in order to internalise the externality. It can enforce this co-operation by means of threatening to impose tari s on the foreign good. These tari s hurt the foreign economy but they do not a ect the domestic economy under the speci c model assumptions chosen by Basevi et al. In what follows, the basic framework of Basevi et al is applied to a standard shock-stabilisation game of monetary policy coordination and combined with tari policy. The size of a`stable' coalition is analysed in the context of an n country model. It has been shown that the free-rider incentive in monetary policy games can restrict the stable coalition size see Martin 1995 and Kohler 1996 . In this paper, it is shown that the prospect of a trade war can enlarge the stable coalition size considerably. The actual size of the stable coalition is determined by the feasible that is, credible size of the penal tari . The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and the reduced form. The mathematical derivation of the model is in Appendices A.1 and A.2. Section 3 presents a model of coalition formation with a package deal. Mathematical solutions are in Appendix A.3. The stable coalition sizes are discussed in Section 3.3; Sections 4.1 and 4.2 discuss possible limits of the model with respect to the dynamics of coalition formation and the credibility o f t h e punishment. The results of simulations performed for Section 3.3 and 4.1 are presented in detail in Appendix B. Section 5 concludes.
The underlying economy
The individual country's economy is described by a linear and static macroeconomic model and a monetary policy rule, which rests on a quadratic pay-o function. It is consistent with the models in Canzoneri and Henderson 1988 , 1991 , Persson and Tabellini 1995 and Buiter et al 1995 The model of Canzoneri and Henderson 1988 is extended by the inclusion of tari policy and generalisation to the n country case. All variables are in natural logarithms, and are expressed in terms of deviations from their values in a zero-disturbance equilibrium, except for ij , which is the ad valorem tari imposed by country i on good j. For simplicity, the deviation of the money supply log from its zero-disturbance value is referred to as`money supply'. This convention applies to all other variables accordingly. The domestic country's variables are indexed by i, while j = 1 : : : n ; j6 = i denotes the foreign countries' variables. A symmetric model is used, that is structures are identical in all economies, since this allows focus on aspects of the coalition formation process that are not driven by di erences among countries but are intrinsic to the process itself. Each country specialises in the production of one good, but consumes all goods. Output y i increases with employment l i , subject to decreasing returns to scale, and decreases with some world productivity disturbance x independently distributed, with mean 0. Pro t-maximising rms hire labour up to the point at which real wages are equal to the marginal product of labour. The money wage is denoted by w i , while p i is the output price:
Home wage-setters set w at the beginning of the period so as to x employment at a full-employment level l i = 0 if disturbances are zero and expectations are ful lled. They minimise the expected deviation of actual employment from full employment b y setting the nominal wage: w i = m e i 3 where m e i is the expected money supply. 2 Actual labour demand might di er because of unexpected disturbances. It is assumed that the wage-setters guarantee that labour demanded is always supplied. The market equilibrium for money is realised when the money supply satis es a simple Cambridge equation: m i = p i + y i 4 where m i is the money supply. . This is obviously minimised by setting w equal to m e . F or the time being, we shall set m e i = 0 .
A rise in the relative price z ij of a foreign good shifts world demand from the foreign good to the home good by . A rise in domestic tari s on imports shifts domestic demand towards the own good by ij 1 . Foreign tari s imposed on the domestic good shift foreign demand away from good i towards their own good by ji 2 . 1 ; 2 0. Note that 2 enters negatively in equation 6. While 1 and 2 represent the e ects of a tari on the two countries that are directly a ected, 3 represents an inverse of the trade diversion e ect known from the theory of customs unions see Viner 1950 . A tari imposed from country i on good j will reduce domestic demand for good j. I n a t wo-country framework, there is only one way to spend the reduced outlay on the foreign good, that is on the domestic good. I n a m ulti-country framework, however, there is the possibility o f substituting towards all other goods. This additional e ect on countries outside' the tari is denoted by 3 . Model symmetry and trade balance 7 require that tari s are zero in the disturbance-free equilibrium, that is, we are in a worldwide free-trade area where no need for policy intervention arises, and that ij 1 = 1 , ij 2 = 2 and ij 3 = 3 for all i 6 = j, that is, the responses to tari changes are the same for all goods. 8 Consequently, the goods market equilibrium can be written as:
redistributed to the consumers. In our model, this would change only the size of the demand elasticities with respect to tari s. 1 and 2 , the tari e ects on the demand for the domestic good, will be smaller under redistribution, since part of the tari revenues is now s p e n t on foreign goods. The e ect on`third-country' demand, 3 , will be larger for the same reason. Eventually, this will lead to a situation where the damage that the tari imposes on the domestic economy is larger, while the damage for the foreign economy is smaller. The reason is that, while having the same direct impact on domestic CPI, the exchange rate movement induced by tari s is not as favourable for the domestic country as in the case considered in the paper here. Hence, though there will still be a tari that can sustain full co-operation, the tari punishment is more likely not to be credible in the case of redistribution. We shall discuss the issue of credibility of the punishment in depth below. 7 The former is a model assumption, the latter results from the model, since we have no capital markets see Appendix A.1. 8 For the proof, see Appendix A.2.
The budget constraint requires that the decrease of demand for a foreign good on which a tari is imposed is matched by an increase in demand for all other goods: 2 = 1 + n , 2 3 . T ari s and real exchange rates are part of prices faced by consumers. Hence, the respective elasticities of the demand functions, 1 , 2 and , can be expressed as functions of each other, which gives: = 1 + 2 , n,1 . That is, a rise in the real exchange rate between two goods is comparable to the situation when a bilateral tari is imposed and the domestic tari is positive while the foreign tari is negative an import subsidy. However, the shift of consumption towards the domestic good is larger when caused by tari s than by a real exchange rate depreciation, since in the former case additionally to the substitution e ect the tari revenues are spent exclusively on the domestic good. This is denoted by the term n,1 . 9 The consumer price index q i is a weighted average of the domestic and the foreign good prices, where all prices are weighted according to expenditure shares.
In ation may be imported via an appreciation of the foreign currency, or equivalently a depreciation of the domestic currency. An increase in domestic tari s will initially increase the CPI. However, as we shall see below, the tari will cause a real appreciation of the domestic currency, which exerts an opposite e ect on the domestic CPI.
Policy-makers' objectives
The policy-maker in the home country has access to two policy instruments, m i , which w e identify with money growth, and ij , which we identify with the tari rate imposed on imports from country j. H e evaluates the e ects of monetary and trade policy according to a loss function over CPI-in ation and employment:
For the proof of these propositions, see Appendix A.2.
where denotes the relative w eight the policy-maker gives to the employment objective. n,2 2 , 1 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 0 in most cases. 10 For an extensive discussion of this interpretation, see Persson and Tabellini 1995. 11 The reduced form is explicitly derived in Appendix A.2.
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The proof for the signs of the coe cients can be checked in Appendix A.1 and A.2 for 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; , and ;, respectively.
To set the basic policy problem, let us consider a symmetric world productivity disturbance that gives rise to a stabilisation game. Without policy intervention, a negative disturbance x 0 will have n o e ect on the countries' employment and CPI increases. Each country's employment is una ected, because its nominal output is una ected; a productivity disturbance lowers a country's real output according to equation 1 and raises the price of its output by equal amounts according to equation 4. Marginal productivity of labour falls, so rms will keep employment constant only if increasing output prices lower real wages. All CPIs increase, because all output prices rise. There are no changes in real exchange rates, since outputs fall by the same amount in all countries, because we h a ve assumed symmetry, and so trade is still balanced. 13 In short, a negative productivity shock will leave employment unchanged and increase CPI in ation. Each policy-maker facing a loss function that increases with the square of employment and CPI deviations now has an incentive t o contract the money supply a little bit in order to lower in ation. The small loss from reducing employment below the full employment level is accepted in exchange for the signi cant gain from lowering in ation.
Monetary policy Contractionary monetary policy in country i alone produces a de ationary e ect through two c hannels: the reduction of the domestic output price and the export of in ation via the real exchange rate. Domestically, a reduction in the money supply has to be matched by a fall in nominal output equation 4, which a ects both real output and prices equations 1, 2. The fall in output will reduce employment equation 1, while the fall in prices lowers CPI in ation. The export of in ation follows from the appreciation of the 13 If we add an international capital market, as in Henderson 1991 or Kohler 1996 , real interest rates would have t o c hange in order to equilibrate the goods markets. The reason is that only part of the income is used for consumption, while the other part of the income is saved. So the fall in output supply is not matched by the fall in demand for this good. A rise in real interest rates that reduces consumption further will re-equilibrate the goods markets. Whether in this case nominal interest rates rise or fall depends on the size of two model parameters. When the real interest rate elasticity of goods demand is lower than the income elasticity o f s a vings, nominal interest rates will rise; if it is the other way around, nominal interest rates will fall see Kohler 1996 . Since the real and the nominal exchange rate do not change, perfect sustitutability on the international capital markets requires that the real interest rates in all countries rise by the same amount. real exchange rate. The fall in output prices improves the terms of trade, lowers the prices of imports, and thus lowers in ation. Abroad, the price of imports is increased, thus causing in ation. This externality is re ected in the negative coe cient is positive of foreign monetary policy in equation 11. If all policy-makers contract money supplies, they vainly try to reduce their domestic in ation by attempting to appreciate their currencies against each other. The exchange rate in the end remains unchanged, but all policy-makers have contracted too much with respect to their optimal money supply. This could be avoided if countries coordinated, producing a less contractionary monetary policy. 14 Tari policy Tari policy a ects in ation without a ecting employment. Domestically, nominal output is una ected equation 4 and with the marginal productivity of labour unchanged there is no change in employment, real output and the output price equations 1, 2. The relative price faced by consumers of the foreign good has increased through the tari . Since this shifts domestic demand towards the home good, the domestic currency appreciates and, eventually, real demand for the domestic good remains constant equation 7. Consequently, imposing tari s on imports has two contrasting e ects on domestic in ation: an anti-in ationary e ect , 1 through the appreciation of the real exchange rate, which makes foreign goods less expensive, and a direct in ationary e ect, since tari s make imported goods more expensive for the consumer. Depending on which e ect dominates, we can distinguish three cases: tari policy reduces domestic in ation 1 1; tari policy a ects only the foreign economies 1 = 1; and tari policy increases domestic in ation 1 1. In the rst case, countries may w ant to try to use tari policy instead of disin ationary monetary policy. They will not have t o h urt the domestic economy b y creating unemployment through de ationary monetary policy, but can export in ation without domestic costs. However, tari policy is an unsuitable instrument to ght in ation, since it will lead directly into a trade war when the other countries retaliate and try to shift the real exchange rate back to its`original' 14 Canzoneri and Gray 1985 were the rst to formalise this type of monetary policy game, which subsequently became the standard argument i n f a vour of international monetary policy coordination. The same type of model was analysed by Canzoneri and Henderson 1988 , 1991 , and Persson and Tabellini 1995 value. A world with many tari s is not desirable, since it increases the losses of all countries, facing higher CPIs, but the same real exchange rates. In the two latter cases, countries are not able to use tari policy as a`direct' instrument to ght in ation; however, they may use tari threats to induce cooperation in the monetary eld, since tari s always hurt the foreign economies by exporting in ation. Since and 1 can be expressed in terms of the expenditure function, we can trace the three cases back to the properties of the underlying utility function or, more precisely, to the signs of the cross-price e ects. 15 Tari policy reduces in ation when the cross-price e ect is negative. This occurs when we h a ve normal goods that are complements. One typical example arises with Leontie -type utility functions, where the consumer wants to consume a basket of goods in which the goods in real terms have xed shares. Tari policy does not a ect the domestic economy when there are no cross-price e ects; 16 that is, when the consumption of good i does not depend on the price of good j. This is the case when the consumer spends a xed nominal share of his income on each good. Tari policy hurts the domestic economy when the cross-price e ects are positive. This is the case when goods are normal goods and substitutes. This case covers all`standard' utility functions, such as CES or Cobb-Douglas utility functions. In what follows, analysis is restricted if not noted otherwise to the last case, which seems to be the most reasonable representation of consumption behaviour for a country with respect to a whole range of goods. Tari s will therefore hurt the domestic economy a little bit and the foreign economy even more.
Coalition formation with a package deal
The previous section outlined how policy-makers will react to a negative productivity shock if they do not co-operate. Since they impose negative externalities on each other, there is scope for improvement through co-operation. For this reason, the literature on international monetary policy coordination has starting with the seminal work of Hamada 1976 argued that coordination is bene cial for all parties involved. 17 In Kohler 1996 , it is argued that countries may prefer forming a coalition to full coordination using the model of the previous section with monetary policy only. The main result was that coalition formation will stop when it reaches a size of three countries. The reason is that the coalition formation process itself causes positive spillovers for the outsiders: the increased discipline within the coalition reduces the negative externalities the coalition countries create for all countries, independent of whether they are`ins' or`outs'. Countries will decide whether to join the union or not on the basis of whether it is more bene cial to reduce imported in ation or to be able to export in ation. Here, the type of`co-operation deal' the coalition o ers is modi ed. The coalition will o er all members the possibility of coordinating monetary policy together with zero tari s, whereas the outsiders will face tari s imposed on their goods in coalition markets. It will be shown that there is always a tari high enough that the incentive t o free-ride on co-operation in monetary policies vanishes, and only a coalition where all countries are members is stable.
The strategies and the equilibrium 3.1.1 The coalition strategy
A coalition is a subset of countries that optimise a common loss function. The common loss function is a weighted average of the individual countries' loss functions. The relative w eights are denoted by 17 The type of model used here has been rst analysed by Canzoneri and Gray 1985. i , with P k i=1 i = 1. Since the model structure is symmetric, it is assumed that the individual countries' weights are equal and, hence, the weight of a coalition member i is equal to 1 k for all i = 1 ; : : : ; k . 18 The coalition consists of the countries i = 1 ; : : : kand optimises:
The coalition as a whole plays a Nash game in monetary policies against the outsiders. The n , k outsiders play a non-cooperative Nash game against all other countries by minimising their individual loss functions. Since tari s hurt the domestic economy, setting any tari above zero is sub-optimal for the coalition if monetary and tari policies are considered separately. H o wever, a penal tari can create an incentive that outweighs the free-riding incentive of monetary policy coordination. The mere threat to punish via the trade sector can be su cient to induce full co-operation. Therefore, it may be in the interest of the coalition to be able to commit to the package deal. The model is solved by rst determining the equilibrium policies for a given coalition size. Tari s are xed at a given level and the optimal monetary policies for this tari are calculated. The stable coalition size for a given penal tari level is then determined. Di erent tari levels will be shown to sustain di erent stable coalition sizes. The tari level that can sustain full co-operation will be called the threshold tari . Roughly speaking, the penalty m ust be high enough to be e ective, but low enough to be credible. The exact meaning of`credible' has to be understood in the context of the game: within a static game, it means that it pays for the coalition to choose this strategy; within a in nitely repeated game, it can be credible through trigger-strategies of the Friedman type; and within an extensive game it has to ful ll the criterion of sub-game-perfection. If the strategy leading to the highest pay-o is not a best response, the coalition has to nd a way to exclude the best-response strategy, i e b y credibly committing to the penal strategy. F or the moment, attention is restricted to a static game, and it is assumed that the coalition o ers only the package deal but not monetary policy coordination alone. This assumption is later relaxed. Once a coalition member, a country will have to stick to the coalition policy. H o wever, the decision whether a country wants to join the coalition or not has to be incentive-compatible for each individual country. Consequently, a coalition is called`stable' when no country would like t o c hange its a liation `in' or`out' unilaterally. The idea behind this is that an equilibrium with a coalition size where the coalition members prefer to join the outs or vice versa is not sustainable. A stability concept is adopted from the analysis of cartels in industrial organisation: 19 L c k ; n L nc k , 1; n and L nc k ; n L c k + 1 ; n The loss function of a non-member is denoted by L nc n; k. If it joins the coalition, it will have the loss L c n; k + 1. If L nc n; k is smaller than L c n; k + 1, the country has no incentive to join the coalition and the coalition is`externally stable'. If on the other hand no member from the coalition has an incentive t o l e a ve the coalition, the coalition is internally stable'. If both conditions are ful lled, the coalition is stable, with size k. The equilibrium strategies that is, optimal money supplies are now discussed for given coalition size and tari levels. 20 3.1.2 The equilibrium strategies and losses outside the coalition
In order to solve the outsider's optimisation problem, n i and q i are replaced in the loss function by the reduced-form equations. This function is minimised with respect to m i , subject to given strategies of the other countries. Since there is a symmetric structure in every respect, we can assume that all countries outside the coalition have the same optimal money supply m nc . The money supply of a non-member is then a function of the coalition's money supply: where nc is the impact of the tari structure faced by an outsider. The optimal policy outside the coalition depends positively on coalition policy, ie the money supplies of a non-member and a coalition member are strategic complements. This means that a less contractionary monetary policy of the coalition members triggers a less contractionary response from the non-members since imported in ation is reduced.
The Nash equilibrium with a coalition
The coalition solves its optimisation problem subject to a given money supply of the non-members. The symmetry assumption m j;c = m c is exploited for all j = 1 ; : : : ; k . This gives a coalition member's reaction function that depends on the non-members' money supply. Through equating the reaction functions, we obtain the equilibrium of the Nash game with a coalition as: with: = , k , 1 + , k , 1 , k , 1 , 2 n , kk 0 ! = 2 2 k n , k + 0
The equilibrium policies in both games are linear functions of the shock x. If the shock is zero, there is no need for a stabilisation game and so the optimal policies are zero c = nc = 0 when there are no tari s. If the shock is negative, ie x 0, the optimal policy for all countries is a contractionary monetary policy, since and ! are positive. 21 3.2 The penal tari structure One feature of the model is crucial for the result in the game when only monetary policy is available: countries have only one instrument for monetary policy available. This does not allow them to impose di erent externalities on members and non-members. Hence, a free-rider problem occurs, which causes instability for coalitions of a size greater than three. With tari policy, h o wever, countries have an instrument available that allows them to apply a di erent tari policy to`friends' or`enemies'. Consequently, they could force countries to join the coalition by threatening them to punish them if they do not co-operate. In economic terms, the coalition threatens to form a customs union against the outsiders, which will worsen the outsiders' welfare by appreciating the coalition's currencies and so increasing the outsiders' in ation. In order to determine the e ects of the tari on the coalition and the outsiders, the following assumptions are now made about a reasonable penal tari structure, and the expressions for c and nc are evaluated.
The coalition forms a customs union. This means that all coalition members apply the same tari to a speci c outsider, and that tari s within the coalition are zero. The assumption of a customs union does not necessarily imply that the coalition imposes the same tari on all outsiders. However, since we h a ve symmetric countries outside the coalition, all outsiders face the same tari from the coalition. Tari s are only used as means of punishment 22 by the coalition to force the outsiders to co-operate. Tari s will not be used by outsiders to retaliate, since the costs of the retaliation would be much higher since the outsider has to punish all coalition members than the gains, that is, the damage it imposes on each coalition member. This is true in particular for larger coalitions such as the`package-upgrade' scenario discussed below. All tari s imposed by non-members will therefore be zero. 23 We can then simplify c and nc , where c denotes the tari imposed by the coalition on outsiders. In both cases, a tari imposed by the coalition has a negative impact on the domestic economy, since it increases 24 and so, according to equation 11, increases in ation, whereas it initially leaves employment una ected. It should be noted, however, that the in ationary impact on the outsiders' economies is increasing with increasing coalition size, while the impact on the coalition economies is decreasing. for an outsider. While the rst terms of each equation denote the damages or costs of a punishment tari imposed by the coalition, the second terms denote the costs or damages of a retaliation tari imposed by the outsiders. It can be easily checked that the costs of a punishment tari for the coalition decrease with coalition size, while the damage it causes for the outsiders increases. In contrast, the costs of a retaliation tari nc for an outsider increase with coalition size, while the damage it creates for the coalition decreases. Hence, punishment tari s from the coalition are much more e ective and credible than retaliation tari s from the outsiders when we have higher coalition sizes. This justi es our assumption that outsiders do not retaliate, in particular when the coalition is not very small. 24 1 and 2 are positive, which explains an in ationary impact for outsiders. The impact on coalition members is in ationary, since = 1 + F i j + 3 n , 2 1 + 3 k , 1 for k n , 1.
The stability of coalitions
The coe cients and ! in the equilibrium policies are non-linear functions of the model parameters. Hence, it is di cult to analyse how the model parameters, in particular k and , a ect the equilibrium outcome. This is even more so if we wish to analyse the stability o f t h e coalition. This is determined by di erences in the losses, which are quadratic in the optimal policies. One possible approach is to perform numerical simulations with speci c values for the model parameters, while varying n; k and . Here, only a summary of the most important results is reported; more detailed results and the results of the sensitivity analysis are discussed in Appendix B. We rst evaluate how tari s a ect external and internal stability of the coalition, and then determine the stable coalition size.
Tari impact on external and internal stability
The coalition is externally stable when no outsider wants to join the coalition. It is internally stable when no member of the coalition wants to leave it. The graphs in Figures 1 to 5 below display the stability conditions when there are n = 22 countries. When the`gains from changing the group' are negative for both groups, coalition and outsiders, the coalition is stable. A coalition where all countries are members is externally stable by de nition, since there is no outsider left to join this explains the`jump' of the graph for external stability from a coalition size of k = 2 1 t o k = 22. Figure 1 shows the stability of the coalition when there are no penal tari s but only monetary policy. The`gains from leaving the coalition' represent the internal stability condition L c k , L nc k , 1 0; thè gains from joining the coalition' are the external stability condition L nc k , L c k + 1 0. Here, the stable coalition size is three. Above a coalition size of three, it pays for countries to leave the coalition and to pro t from the spillovers of coalition discipline while setting an individually optimal response. With increasing coalition size, the potential gains from free-riding become even larger. Below three, on the other hand, it pays to form a coalition with other countries in order to reduce the competitive appreciation of uncoordinated monetary policy.
In the monetary policy game with zero tari s, the outsiders are always Figure 1 : External and internal stability with zero tari s a a Negative`gains from changing the group' imply that keeping its a liation does pay, so that the group is stable. k denotes the coalition size that ful ls both stability criteria.
better o than the coalition members, since monetary policies are strategic complements see Kohler 1996 .
Figures 2 to 5 show h o w external and internal stability develop for di erent tari s. The`gains from leaving the coalition', which represent internal instability, decrease with increasing coalition size before they start rising again, possibly into the positive area that denotes instability. Two e ects shape this function. The damage that tari s impose on the outsiders increases with coalition size. On the other hand, the damage that tari s cause to the coalition economies through in ation of the CPI decreases with coalition size. In combination, these two e ects diminish the incentive t o l e a ve the coalition as coalition size increases. 25 This is even more the case for higher tari s, since part of the tari e ect is counterbalanced by a more contractionary monetary policy both optimal monetary policies are negatively dependent on , which increases`genuine' incentives to coordinate monetary policies.
This diminishing e ect is moderated by the free-riding incentive o f monetary policy coordination, which can be best observed in the game with zero tari s. Internal stability without tari s decreases with coalition size because of the reduced coalition externalities, which create a free-riding incentive. When higher coalition sizes are reached, the incentive to free-ride dominates. This explains the U-shape of the internal stability function. External stability is in uenced by the same factors, which n o w w ork the other way around. For a low coalition size, incentives to join the coalition are small, since penalties are only imposed through few tari s, whereas the countries imposing the tari s have to face a relatively high cost, since they have to punish a large outsider group. This stance, however, is counterbalanced by a n i n trinsic gain from coordinating monetary policy for low k. With increasing coalition size, it becomes more desirable to join the coalition, because of the increasing tari burden for outsiders and the decreasing tari burden inside the coalition. But the free-riding incentives of monetary policy become dominant with higher coalition sizes, leading to a inverse U-shaped form of the external stability function.
Threshold tari level
An increase in the tari `shifts' the stability functions: the external stability function is shifted upwards and the internal stability function is shifted downwards. The crucial`middle' part of the function, where the tari burden becomes too heavy for the outsiders and the free-riding incentive is not yet large enough for coalition members to leave, is larger the higher the tari . If this`middle' part, where the coalition is externally not stable and internally stable, extends over the full coordination point o f k = n, w e can reach full coordination as a stable coalition, since at this point the coalition is externally stable, as there are no countries left to contemplate the participation decision. The threshold tari level is the minimum tari level that sustains full coordination. It has been calculated for various values for the model parameters. The results of the analysis are illustrated in Figure 6 for di erent v alues of the parameters ; and . 26 The parameter that in uences the threshold tari level most is 1-, which denotes the productivity of labour. For 0:5, the highest threshold tari level is 0.3, that is, a 30 ad valorem tari on the price of the imported good. Very low v alues of require a tari above t wo h undred percent. a ects the size of the threshold tari level much more than any other parameter, because it changes the relative importance of free-riding and penal tari avoidance. A high low labour productivity implies that the externalities of foreign monetary policy are low and the e ectiveness of domestic monetary policy is high. In a situation like this, coordinated and non-coordinated monetary policies are not very di erent, and so gains from being able to free-ride are not very high. Since the impact of the tari does not depend on , i t i s m uch less pro table to bear a tari punishment in order simply to exploit the gains from free-riding if is low. Though the in uence of the other parameters is much less signi cant, the threshold tari level decreases with increasing ; 1 and 2 . A higher propensity to import and a higher tari elasticity of demand increase the impact of the tari punishment nc , and so act as if the tari were higher. The threshold tari level increases, however, with the number of the countries n. The reason is that an increase in n reduces nc , the measure of the damage caused by the tari s for the outsider, and so a higher tari is necessary for the punishment to be e ective. The threshold tari increases, too, with , the weight o f t h e employment target in the loss function. Since the tari damages the outsider's economy through in ation, the tari punishment i s m uch more e ective when in ation has a relatively high priority, that is for a low . Only when priority shifts to the full-employment target, that is, increases, will the in ationary damage a tari causes become less important. Then only a high penalty will create enough in ation for countries to try to avoid the tari punishment.
Dynamic aspects of the package deal
Up to now, the focus has been on static aspects of the stability o f t h e coalition. The idea is that a given coalition is not sustainable if it is not stable, in the sense that it must be individually optimal for a country to be a coalition member. It has been assumed that the coalition does not o er coordination in a single eld but a package deal. In the following two sections, two di erent aspects of the`stable coalition' that are more`dynamic' are discussed. They deal with the formation of the coalition and the credibility of the package deal.
The process of coalition formation
It has been pointed out that there is always a tari level high enough that it can sustain full coordination as the stable coalition. However, it is worth considering in more detail the coalition formation process, since there may be a problem in`getting the coalition o the ground'. As can be seen in Figures 1 to 5 , for a very low coalition size below four or ve members, the coalition is internally instable, but externally stable. That is, no country wants to join the coalition, but coalition members want to leave it. This situation changes, however, when the coalition has a larger size: outsiders then want to join the coalition and insiders do not want to leave it. Now consider a coalition formation process where one country enters after the other. There may b e problems if the group of`founding members' is too small, since then it would not be able to reach the`critical size'. There are two possible ways out of this dilemma. First, the model may be more appropriate for analysis of a`package upgrade' between existing customs union members than for analysis of coalition formation starting with two members. The game considered so far is not intrinsically dynamic. A game that explicitly deals with the formation of the coalition would have t o t a k e other dynamic features of monetary policy games, such as expectation formation of the private sector over time, into consideration. The theory of repeated games, which increases the sustainability of co-ordination, would have to be applied. All these aspects are neglected here and, therefore, the model is probably less suitable to explain the dynamic process of coalition formation.
However, if we start from a pre-existing trade bloc, this could easily exceed the`founding size' of ve countries. Above this size, the increase is guaranteed: there are negative gains from leaving the coalition, but positive ones from joining it. Hence, the model may serve as a potential application where a`package upgrade' from a trade block to a currency block i s i n volved. In this light, there is an alternative i n terpretation of the`Fortress Europe' idea. Typically, F ortress Europe' denotes the establishment or increase of external barriers of an internal European economic policy bloc. This creation of barriers can be considered to be the result of the e orts of all members to keep their existing national protection. Here, there is another, complementary explanation: threats of outside tari s could be used to sustain policy co-operation for insiders. Another feature worth noting could provide a second solution to thè starting problem'. For higher tari s 0:5 and more countries n 9 particularly, losses inside the coalition are lower than outside the coalition. This can provide a motivation for countries to go ahead and join the coalition early. They may w ant to belong to the insiders, in case the tari punishments are actually imposed on outsiders. This incentive m a y help to reach the critical initial size of the coalition.
The credibility of punishment in an extensive game
The question of the credibility of the tari penalty has been excluded, by assuming that the coalition will only have the choice of adopting the package deal, but not either of the two policies separately. This assumption is justi ed, in that the coalition knows that with monetary policy alone it can not sustain a coalition with more than three countries. Therefore, it would like to be able to commit to the`package deal', particularly since it is possible to sustain full coordination, and so tari s are a threat not actually imposed. It could be asked, however, what happens if the coalition cannot commit credibly, for instance on institutional grounds.
A c hain store paradox In order to answer this question, it may b e reasonable to split the game int o a t wo-stage game, as in Basevi et al 1990. In the rst stage, monetary policy is conducted and the coalition is decided upon. In the second stage, the outsiders are punished by tari s imposed by the coalition. The extensive game has the structure of the`chain store paradox' discussed in Selten 1978. 27 Like the incumbent in Selten's model, the coalition would prefer to credibly commit to the threat of tari punishments. However, once the coalition is formed, it is not optimal to carry out the punishment, since it would hurt the coalition as well. If we were to select strictly sub-game perfect equilibria only, the coalition's rational' choice would be not to impose any tari punishments, and the outsiders would not join the coalition beyond size three. Selten argues, however, that sub-game perfection does not select the intuitively most plausible solution for such a game. Intuitively, one would expect that the coalition will be willing to carry out the punishments the rst times they become necessary, in order to build up a reputation to be`tough', and so to avoid the situation where other countries do not join the coalition. Only if the potential gains from maintaining the reputation are lower than the costs of tari punishments would the coalition not try to build up a reputation. Numerical analysis has been performed in order to evaluate whether the costs of punishment exceed the potential gains through reputation. The potential gains are determined by the di erence of the losses between the actual coalition size and a coalition of three countries. The results of the analysis are summarised in Table A . 28 We h a ve determined the maximum n umber of outsiders that can be punished with the threshold tari . This implies a minimum coalition size necessary so that punishment of outsiders pays o . Even though the punishment h urts 27 In Selten's model, a chain store operates in N markets, in each of which there is a prospective e n trant. In case of entry of the competitor, the incumbent can either ght or accommodate. The entrant's pro t is positive if the incumbent accommodates, and negative if he ghts. The incumbent incurs negative pro ts if he ghts, positive pro ts if he accommodates, and the highest pro ts if the competitors stay out. Decisions are made sequentially. In the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, all potential competitors enter and the chain store behaves passively in all markets. However, intuition suggests that the chain store should act aggressively towards early entrants in order to deter later entrants: it should try to acquire a reputation for being aggressive.
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The details of the analysis are given in Appendix B.
the coalition countries, they are still better o than without tari threats with a coalition of three, that is in these cases. The analysis shows that if there are six countries, it pays to punish one or two outsiders. If there are seven or more countries, even three outsiders or more can be punished if this leads to a coalition comprising the remaining countries. That is one more country than the stable coalition when there are no tari s. Hence, the gains from having one more country in the coalition outweigh the losses of punishing all the remaining countries. 29 Each country that would like to leave the coalition will be punished, since this ensures that the`necessary' four or ve countries remain in the coalition. Therefore, no country will want to stay out. This solution, however, is not formal, since building up a reputation requires a model of sequential entrance. The following paragraph outlines such a formal model; the analysis is left for later work.
Solutions to the chain store paradox Kreps and Wilson 1982 and Milgrom and Roberts 1982 have suggested a resolution to the paradox, 30 based on a model of incomplete information on the outsider's part regarding the`type' of the coalition. It is assumed that the outsider does not know which t ype' the coalition is, a`tough' type 29 These results do not vary with the parameter values see Appendix B, though they have been tested only up to a total number of ten countries. For more countries, there is probably a limit to the size of the fringe. 30 The model that they suggest is modi ed in that the incumbent can now b e either weak or strong. If he is strong, he`enjoys' ghting, since it is his dominant strategy. I f h e i s w eak, ghting is costly and can be worthwhile only if it raises pro ts in another market through building up a reputation for being`strong'. Only the incumbent knows whether he is`strong' or`weak'. The sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game has the following features: in the rst markets, entry does not occur. If a rm would enter by mistake, it would be fought b y both types. Because the number of markets shrink over time, concerns about reputation become smaller. This encourages entrants to enter. This equilibrium requires that the probability of being strong is not too small. which punishes, or a`soft' type which accommodates if challenged. The tough type will always punish, since it is his dominant strategy, whereas the soft type will only punish in order to build up a reputation of being tough. If the probability that the coalition is tough is high enough, no outsider will initially dare to stay out. Only after several countries have joined the coalition will some countries try to stay outside and accept the risk of being punished. In order to formalise such a model, however, one has to justify incomplete information and di erent t ypes of pay-o functions for the coalition, one of which has to have a dominant strategy of imposing tari s on outsiders. An example of the latter is that there may b e a di erent loss function for the coalition, resulting from further gains from the imposition of tari s. One could draw in this context on the trade policy literature, where the existence of tari s is explained either by the existence of increasing returns to scale 31 or by lobbying from industries that seek protection. 32 Additionally, it is necessary to introduce some degree of incomplete information on the side of the outsiders. Extending the game into a game of sequential entrance, that is, giving it a time dimension, opens up di erent solution concepts based on repeated games. In in nitely repeated games, it is easier to sustain co-operative outcomes since future losses from playing non-cooperatively instead of co-operation are taken into account. Then we w ould probably get di erent results even in the pure monetary policy co-operation game. Additionally, adding a time dimension would require an explicitly dynamic model, which w ould deal with such issues as those of credibility of the monetary authority t o wards the private sector. We leave this for future research.
Conclusion
In the real world,`package deals' can be observed more often than simple coordination in speci c policy elds. This paper provides a formal model that tries to explain why this comes about, and what the advantages are of a package deal vis-a-vis single policy coordination. In order to evaluate`package deal' questions, the game of Basevi et al 1990 has been applied to a standard model of monetary policy coordination and extended to more than two countries. This covers the issue of a customs union that wants to extend coordination to the monetary eld. The customs union can be exploited strategically to in uence the formation of a currency bloc. Monetary policy coordination alone provides small incentives to form larger blocs, since the free-riding incentive dominates the gains from co-operation above the three-country case. Tari policy threats, however, add an incentive that makes full coordination sustainable if the tari level is high enough. The most important di erence between the two policy instruments is that monetary policy does not allow the policy-maker to apply a di erent policy to co-operators and to defectors, whereas tari policy allows discrimination between them. There are problems in analysing trade policy in models that are mainly used to explain monetary policy coordination. In these models, trade policy will generally not be pro table for either economy. Consequently, the penal tari may face problems of credibility, particularly if the threshold tari is high. Then we h a ve either to lower the`damage' and take the risk that full coordination cannot be sustained, or we h a ve t o modify the model in line with the reputation models of Kreps and Wilson 1982 and Milgrom and Roberts 1982 . In this case too, full co-operation may not be sustainable. The real aggregate demand function for good i is derived from a combination of loglinearisation and linear approximation of the expenditure functions, following the procedure proposed by Canzoneri and Henderson 1988 , page 100. Aggregate demand for good i is the sum of domestic private demand, foreign private demand and domestic public demand. The latter is equal to the domestic tari revenues that the government spends exclusively on the domestic good. f ij denotes the expenditure function of country i on good j. All capital letter variables denote the respective v ariables in levels. Nominal expenditure is dependent on income which equals nominal output in our model if money markets are in equilibrium and the respective domestic prices of all goods. Hence, nominal expenditures in domestic currency are: f ii P i Y i ; fE ih P h 1 + ih g h = 1 : : : n domestic private outlays for good i f ij P i Y i ; fE ih P h 1 + ih g h = 1 : : : n domestic private outlays for good j f ji P j Y j ; fE jh P h 1 + jh g h = 1 : : : n foreign private outlays for good i
All real expenses are in terms of units of good i. The price of the domestic good abroad is E ji P i 1 + ji = Pi1+ ji Eij ; hence, the foreign demands for good i have t o b e m ultiplied by Eij Pi1+ ji . Bearing in mind that expenditure functions are linear-homogenous in prices and hence, in real exchange rates and in ad valorem tari s 1 + , the real aggregate demand for good i in levels is: In this paragraph, we derive the restrictions that three model features Walras' law, balanced trade, symmetric countries impose on the expenditure functions and, hence, on the parameters of the demand functions. Whereas the rst two conditions must hold, since we are in a general equilibrium framework, the latter is an assumption. Walras' law must hold with equality when the budget constraints hold with equality, and trade must always be balanced since we h a ve no capital markets. This imposes restrictions on the properties of the expenditure functions and, hence, on the elasticities 1 ; 2 ; 3 and .
Walras' law Walras' law requires that the n goods demands are linear-dependent. Summing up all demand equations yields an identity for all variable values only if
This condition describes the redistribution of domestic outlay following a decrease in demand for good j due to a tari imposed on this good. The outlay reduction for good j is distributed to good i according to the elasticity 1 and, in equal parts since we h a ve symmetric expenditure functions, to the remaining n , 2 goods.
Trade balance Trade must be always balanced, since we h a ve n o capital markets. Substituting the budget constraint Y i = f ii + P n j=1 j6 =i f ij i n to the goods demand A1 gives the trade balance:
Hence, the trade-balance restriction is ensured when the budget constraints are ful lled and goods markets are cleared.
In the long-run equilibrium with natural rates of output being the same in all countries and an equilibrium real exchange rate of unity bilateral tari s must be equal. Both monetary and tari policy would shift the economy a way from the disturbance-free equilibrium where the loss function takes its minimum value. Consequently, the
Pareto-e cient tari structure in the long-run equilibrium is zero tari s, since tari s would only increase the CPI but not a ect the real exchange rate, because all bilateral tari s have to be equal. That is, ij = ji 8j; i
Using zero-equilibrium tari s and the budget constraints, while equilibrium real exchange rates are unity and natural rates of output are Y , w e can write: Model symmetry Model symmetry requires that the partial derivatives of the expenditure functions across countries and across goods are symmetric. This includes:
The shares of additional income that are spent on domestic foreign goods are equal across countries: Y A2 An intuitive explanation of the last expression for goes as follows. A tari on good j imposed by country i c hanges the demand for good i as if the price of good j had increased minus the substitution e ects abroad, since only domestic demand shifts, whereas foreign demand remains unaltered in the rst place. The cross-price e ects are equal across countries, because of the symmetry. If 1 is positive, then 1 is only larger than one if the cross-price e ects are negative. Then, however, might become negative. If 1 is negative, 1 is always smaller than one, since this case can only occur when the cross-price e ects are negative.
A.1.3 Signs of the elasticities
The signs of the elasticities of the demand function depend on the properties of the underlying utility function. F i 0 F j 0 denotes the change of a country's demand for the domestic foreign good with respect to its income. If the good is a normal inferior good, this term is positive negative. We h a ve assumed that each country spends a positive fraction of its income on all goods. If we assume that this holds as well for an additional unit of income, all goods are normal goods. F i 0 F j 0 0 F i i F j j denotes the own price e ect of a domestic foreign good. This e ect is negative for normal goods and positive for Gi en goods. If we assume that all goods are normal with respect to changes in income, we h a ve no Gi en goods, 35 and so the demand for a good will always decrease when its price increases.
F i j ; j6 = i is the cross-price e ect of the demand for good i with respect to the price of good j. I f i and j are substitutes complements, the cross-price e ect is positive negative, assuming that good j is a normal good. In other words, if the demand for j falls when it becomes more expensive, the demand for i falls as well if it is a complement, and rises if i is a substitute for j. I f j is a Gi en good, it is the other way around. However, since the case of Gi en goods is rather theoretical, we shall neglect it. F i j 0 0 if i; j are substitutes complements and normal goods. We summarise the possible combinations of the features of the expenditure function and how they a ect the signs of the elasticities of tari s and of the real prices in Table B. If not noted otherwise, we shall assume that all goods are normal and substitutes and so 1 ; 2 ; 3 and are positive and, according to equation A2, is larger than 1 . 35 The Slutsky equation requires that Gi en goods are strongly inferior goods. We shall reduce the economy's model, equations 1 8, to two equations that express the equilibrium values of employment and CPI in terms of the policy instruments, money supplies and tari s, and of the model parameters. We assume that the expected money supply more precisely, its deviation for wage-setters is zero. Substituting equation 3 i n to 2 gives: p i = l i + x A3 Substituting A3 and 1 i n to 4 yields the reduced form for employment: l i = m i , m e i = m i A4 Thus, employment c hanges one-for-one with the domestic money supply, and is not a ected by the other policy variables, that is, foreign money supply or tari s. Substituting 10 i n to A3 and 1 gives the equilibrium values of the output and its price level:
We substitute equation A6 i n to equation 7 and solve for P n j=1 j6 =i z ij . Substituting this expression and equation A5 i n to equation 8 gives the reduced form for the CPI:
The rst-order condition and the symmetry assumption for outsiders give the money supply of a non-member as a function of the coalition's money supply:
The reaction function of a coalition member The coalition solves its optimisation problem subject to a given money supply of the non-members: This ensures that 1 and 2 remain within the limits n,1 and 2 n,1 , and 3 remains between zero and n,1 . In addition, ,F j j m ust always be higher than F i j if 3 has to be positive.
B.1 Threshold tari s
For each set of parameter values, we calculate the minimum tari level that can sustain full coordination. In Table C , we present the results of the univariate analysis.
In short, the threshold tari decreases in ; ; ,F j j and F i j ; i t increases in and n. The damage of the tari nc increases with the propensity to import and the tari elasticities of the demand, 1 and 2 which increase in F i j and F j j , respectively. Consequently, the threshold tari level is lower when these parameters take higher values. The inverse is true for the number of countries n; the higher n, the less the damage caused by the tari , since the trade volume with one country decreases with the number of trading partners n , 1. Since the damage caused by tari s decreases with n, the threshold tari level must increase with n. represents the weight of the employment target in the policy-maker's objective function. A low means that in ation is relatively more important and, hence, the tari punishment that creates in ation has more impact, too. Therefore, for low , a l o wer tari level will be su cient to sustain full co-operation. Changes of show the largest impact on the threshold tari level. The reason is that in uences the relative importance of being able to free-ride and avoiding the tari punishment. A high implies that , which represents the impact of foreign monetary policy on the domestic economy, i s l o w. Therefore, coordinated and uncoordinated monetary policies do not di er very much, and gains from free-riding are relatively small for high . It does then not pay o to undergo a tari punishment, which does not change with . Hence, the threshold tari level is lower when is higher.
The multivariate analysis does not give results much di erent from the univariate analysis. Hence, in Table D we summarise only the results for the most in uential parameter, . 36 We report the threshold tari level that supports full coordination for all possible values of all parameters except for , which is quoted explicitly. Again, is the most in uential parameter, and a ects the threshold tari level inversely. If the coalition cannot commit credibly to the tari threat on eg institutional grounds, it may p a y o for the coalition to actually punish in order to build up a reputation. Punishment of outsiders pays o if the gains from the`additional' coordination gained through reputation that is, coordination beyond three countries exceeds the costs of punishment. We calculated the costs of punishment and balanced it against the gains, assuming that all countries except for the`outsiders' join the punishment s c heme. The penal tari is equal to the threshold tari level for each parameter constellation. We h a ve determined the maximum n umber of outsiders that may be punished. We can derive from this number the minimum coalition size that is needed for punishment of outsiders to pays o . If we h a ve six countries, it pays always to punish up to two outsiders; if we h a ve seven countries, it pays to punish up to three outsiders; if we have eight countries, it pays to punish up to four outsiders. Since there are always three countries in the coalition when there are no tari 36 We report here only a summary of the multivariate analysis. The detailed results can be obtained on request from the author. threats, this means that punishment of outsiders is always worthwhile for the coalition, if this ensures that at least one more member joins the coalition. Table E We present the results of the univariate sensitivity analysis in Table E. The result described above if the coalition gains only one more member, the tari punishment s c heme pays holds for all parameter values. 37 37 F i j and F j j , though not reported here, do not change the results.
